The Argument from Moral Knowledge and Agency
Why Moral Knowledge and Agency Are Evidence For Theism
Introduction
Contemporary arguments from morality to theism typically proceed by way of a metaphysical claim: namely, that objective moral facts require a theistic foundation. In its most familiar form, associated perhaps most directly in popular apologetics with William Lane Craig (2008), the argument maintains that if God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist, and since they do exist, God exists.
Whatever one thinks of that line of reasoning — and, in some form, I have more sympathy for it than I once did — it is not the one I will defend here. Even granting that there are objective moral facts, it does not follow straightforwardly that their existence depends upon God. Non-theistic forms of moral realism remain serious and sophisticated options, as in the work of, for example, Derek Parfit (2011) and David Enoch (2011).
The question I wish to consider is different. It is not merely why there are moral truths, but why there are creatures like us — creatures who can know them and whose agency is structured around them. The conjunction of moral knowledge and moral agency is, I will argue, a striking and theoretically significant feature of reality. My claim is that it is a feature which is considerably more expected and intelligible on theism than on atheism, and thus constitutes serious evidence in favor of the former over the latter.
I proceed as follows. I begin by clarifying the phenomenon to be explained — the existence of objective moral truth, together with our epistemic access to it and our status as agents responsive to moral reasons. I then argue that, on a broadly atheistic picture, this conjunction is antecedently unlikely, given the evolutionary origins of our cognitive and motivational capacities. By contrast, I suggest that on theism it is not surprising, but rather fits naturally within a purposive and value-laden order. I conclude by stating the argument in standard form and then considering the most serious objections to it.
1. A Contrast with Standard Moral Arguments
It is worth being explicit about how this argument differs from more familiar moral arguments for God’s existence.
Standard arguments in this domain are primarily ontological. They aim to show that the existence of objective moral facts themselves requires a theistic foundation. If moral truths are irreducibly normative (i.e., if they are such that they cannot be adequately defined in terms of purely descriptive facts), the thought goes, then they must ultimately be grounded in something like a divine will or nature (if they are to be grounded at all).
The present argument does not depend upon that claim. It is consistent with the existence of objective moral truths in a purely non-theistic universe. One can, with Parfit (2011), regard moral truths as necessary features of reality without grounding them in God.
What calls for explanation, on the present approach, is not the existence of moral truths, but the existence of moral knowers and agents. Even if moral truths are “just there,” it remains a further and non-trivial question why there should exist creatures capable of grasping them and being guided by them.
The argument is, therefore, not primarily metaphysical, but epistemic and agential. It is concerned with the question: why does the world contain beings whose cognitive and motivational structures are attuned to normative reality?
2. The Explanandum
The argument proceeds from three propositions.
First, there are objective moral facts — truths about what one ought to do and what is valuable, independent of anyone’s attitudes.
Second, there are beings who possess at least some moral knowledge. This is not merely the claim that we have moral beliefs, but that some of those beliefs are true and non-accidentally connected to the facts.
Third, there are moral agents. They are capable of recognizing moral considerations as reasons, deliberating about them, and are at least sometimes motivated in accordance with those judgments.
The conjunction of these three facts is what stands in need of explanation.
3. The Atheistic Picture
On a broadly naturalistic or atheistic worldview, human beings are the products of evolutionary processes operating through natural selection. These processes are sensitive to reproductive fitness rather than truth as such.
This generates a familiar tension in the moral case. As Sharon Street (2006) argues, our evaluative attitudes are deeply shaped by evolutionary pressures that are indifferent to stance-independent moral truth. If that is right, then the alignment between our moral beliefs and objective moral facts — if such facts exist — appears to be a striking coincidence.
One might respond that evolution favors cooperation, altruism, and other traits that plausibly align with moral truth. But this response does not go far. Evolutionary processes select for behaviors and dispositions that enhance fitness, not for the truth of the beliefs that accompany them. The connection between adaptive success and moral truth is indirect and contingent.
A related thought is raised by Alvin Plantinga (2011), who argues that naturalism combined with evolution gives us reason to doubt the reliability of our cognitive faculties more generally. Whether or not one accepts Plantinga’s contention in full, the moral case is particularly acute, given that moral truths, if they exist, are not causally efficacious features of the environment in the way that ordinary empirical features are. It is therefore unclear how evolutionary processes would reliably produce beliefs that track them.
Even if one brackets the epistemic issue, there remains a further problem concerning agency. There is no obvious reason, given atheism, to expect that creatures who form moral judgments would also be motivationally responsive to them. One can easily conceive of beings who recognize moral facts but are entirely indifferent to them, or whose motivations are only contingently aligned with their evaluative beliefs.
The point is not that moral knowledge and moral agency are impossible on atheism. It is that, given the vast range of possible evolutionary outcomes, their emergence appears antecedently unexpected — a kind of happy coincidence.
4. The Theistic Alternative
On theism, the situation is very different. Suppose that reality is grounded in a perfectly good and rational creator. On such a view, value is not an accidental feature of reality, but is rooted in the nature of a perfectly good being.
Within this framework, the existence of moral agents with moral knowledge is far less surprising. If a perfectly good creator has reason to bring about creatures capable of recognizing and responding to value, then we would expect the existence of beings whose cognitive faculties are, under appropriate conditions, responsive to moral truth, and whose motivational structures are at least partially aligned with their evaluative judgments.
Theism does not entail that human beings possess perfect moral knowledge or flawless moral motivation. But it provides a framework in which the existence of creatures who approximate these ideals is intelligible as a non-accidental feature of reality.
5. Standard Form of the Argument
The argument can be stated in standard form as follows:
1. There are objective moral facts.
2. Human beings possess some moral knowledge.
3. Human beings are moral agents whose cognition and motivation are, to some extent, responsive to moral reasons.
4. On theism, the existence of beings with moral knowledge and moral agency is to be expected.
5. On atheism, the existence of beings with moral knowledge and moral agency is antecedently improbable.
6. Therefore, the existence of beings with moral knowledge and moral agency is evidence favoring theism over atheism.
The structure is comparative, so the claim is not that atheism is incompatible with moral knowledge and agency — only that it renders them significantly less likely than does theism.
6. Objections and Replies
Let us turn now to four predictable objections.
6.1 Evolutionary Explanations
Perhaps the most straightforward objection would be that moral cognition is adaptive, and that true moral beliefs promote cooperation, stability, and flourishing. If so, then the emergence of moral knowledge would not be surprising given atheism, admitting of a complete evolutionary explanation.
The difficulty is that adaptive success does not require truth-tracking. Evolution can produce beliefs that are useful without being true — and can even produce systematically false beliefs so long as they generate fitness-enhancing behavior. The fact that certain moral beliefs are adaptive does not explain why they would align with stance-independent moral truths (indeed, that any moral beliefs are adaptive is itself a surprising fact that calls out for eplanation). As Street (2006) herself points out, evolutionary considerations seem to undermine, rather than support, the reliability of our moral beliefs.
6.2 Moral Anti-Realism
A second objection rests on conceding the above point but rejecting moral realism. On moral anti-realism, there are no stance-independent moral facts for our beliefs to track. Our moral judgments are instead grounded in our evaluative attitudes and our practical standpoint.
This move dissolves the epistemic problem — but at the cost of giving up objective morality (which no one should do!). The argument developed here presupposes that there are objective moral facts. Those who reject that assumption will not be moved by it. But for those who accept moral realism — as many philosophers do — the challenge remains.
6.3 The Probability of Moral Agency
A third objection targets the probability claim about moral agency. It may be argued that the evolution of moral agents is not especially unlikely. Given sufficient time and complexity, the emergence of sophisticated cognitive and social capacities may make moral cognition and motivation predictable.
This response must do more than show that moral behavior is likely: it must show that moral knowledge is likely. The transition from adaptive behavior to truth-tracking belief is non-trivial, especially in the moral domain. Moreover, the response must explain the connection between moral judgment and motivation: even if evolution explains why we behave cooperatively, it does not follow that we would come to experience those behaviors as normatively required or be motivated by reasons as such.
6.4 The Explanatory Power of Theism
Finally, one might object that theism does not genuinely explain moral knowledge and agency. Positing a good creator does not, by itself, provide a detailed account of how we come to know moral truths.
This objection has some force, but it demands more than the argument requires. The claim is not that theism provides a complete epistemology of morality. It is that theism renders the existence of moral knowledge and agency less surprising by situating them within a purposive and value-laden order. By contrast, atheism offers no comparable explanation for why creatures capable of grasping and responding to normative truths should exist at all.
Conclusion
If there are objective moral truths, and if human beings possess some genuine knowledge of them and are capable of acting on their basis, then we are confronted with a striking feature of reality. We are creatures who can apprehend normative facts and whose agency is, at least in part, governed by them.
The question is how best to explain that fact. The argument developed here suggests that theism provides a better explanation than atheism. It does not follow that theism is true. But it does follow that our status as moral knowers and agents is not explanatorily neutral: it is evidence for theism.
References
Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith. 3rd ed. Crossway, 2008.
Enoch, David. Taking Morality Seriously. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Plantinga, Alvin. Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Street, Sharon. “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Philosophical Studies 127 (2006): 109–166.
I think there are two serious problems with this argument.
Arguments like this don't actually compare theism with atheism given some datum they compare atheism or naturalism simpliciter with a very specific version of theism: one on which God is a perfectly good being with unconstrained power, knowledge, and a particular set of intentions toward creation. So the comparison isn't A vs T, it's really A vs (T & tri-omni & a-set-of-intentions), where all the heavy lifting is being done by the add-ons rather than by bare theism itself. But once you see that, the move loses much of its force because you can attach analogous add-ons to atheism or naturalism just as easily. Nagel's teleological naturalism is exactly this: atheism plus the thesis that mind and value are fundamental features of reality with an intrinsic tendency toward realization. Aristotelian naturalism is another: naturalism plus a robust account of natural teleology grounded in what kind of thing we are. Both of these predict moral knowledge and agency without God. So if the datum is evidence for anything, it's not evidence for theism over atheism as such for that you'd need to show that bare theism, once updated on the datum, yields a higher posterior than bare atheism does. What the argument actually shows, at best, is that the datum is evidence for versions of theism that already have built into them the intentions and values that make the datum expected.
The second problem concerns the first premise of the argument itself. If we grant that there are objective moral facts, then there are also objective facts about evil: that suffering is bad, that cruelty is wrong, that vast amounts of undeserved harm occur, that a vast amount of evil appears to be gratuitous. These facts are in significant tension with the specific version of theism being invoked here, namely one featuring an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good creator. So even if we agree that P(moral knowledge & agency & facts | atheism) is very low, it's not obvious why P(moral knowledge & agency & facts | theism-with-omni-properties) wouldn't be even lower (it appears to be).