The Argument From Agential Freedom
Why rational agency is evidence for theism
Introduction
In addition to stars, planets, chemical reactions, plants, and animals, our world contains rational, free agents. These are beings who deliberate about what to do, form intentions, make decisions, and carry out plans. When someone apologizes to a friend, writes a book, or decides to move across the country, we describe these events as acts the person performed.
This aspect of human life is so familiar that it rarely strikes us as philosophically remarkable. Yet the existence of agents — beings whose actions arise from deliberation, intention, and reasons — is a striking fact of reality. Why does the universe contain such entities at all?
In this essay, I argue that the existence of agential freedom, understood in a minimal and widely accepted sense, constitutes serious evidence for theism. The argument does not presuppose controversial claims about libertarian free will or ultimate moral responsibility. Instead, it begins with a more modest datum: the observation that human beings genuinely act for reasons. The central claim is that the existence of agency is more expected on theism than on atheistic naturalism.
I proceed by first clarifying the minimal notion of agential freedom at issue, then considering why the existence of such agency is puzzling within a purely naturalistic framework, and ultimately by arguing that theism provides a more natural explanatory context for the existence of agents. I close by considering some potential objections.
1. Agential Freedom
Philosophical debates about freedom often focus on the concept of free will, particularly on the question of whether human freedom is compatible with determinism. For present purposes, we can work with a simpler and more ecumenical notion: agential freedom.1
Agential freedom refers to the capacity of agents to perform actions that are, in some meaningful sense, under their control. An action exhibits agential freedom when it arises from the agent’s intentions, deliberations, or reasons rather than being wholly imposed from outside. This notion is deliberately modest.
This minimal conception of agency is widely acknowledged across otherwise divergent positions in the free-will debate. Compatibilists such as Daniel Dennett and John Martin Fischer, libertarians such as Robert Kane, and skeptics such as Galen Strawson (an impossibilist about ultimate moral responsibility) and Pereboom (a hard incompatibilist) all recognize that human beings deliberate, form intentions, and act in ways guided by reasons, even if they disagree sharply about whether such agency grounds ultimate moral responsibility (Dennett 1984; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Kane 1996; Strawson 1994; Pereboom 2001).2
The phenomenon in question, then, is relatively uncontroversial. Human beings deliberate about what to do, and our deliberations frequently guide our actions. The question is not “Does rational agency exist?” but rather “Why is there rational agency at all?”
The existence of agency also raises a deeper issue concerning normativity. To act for reasons is not merely to behave in complex ways but to respond to considerations that count in favor of certain actions rather than others. Agency therefore presupposes a world in which reasons can guide behavior and in which agents are capable of recognizing and responding to such reasons. Philosophers have increasingly noted that the place of normativity within a purely naturalistic ontology is not straightforward (Korsgaard 2009; Nagel 2012). The existence of rational agents is thus connected to a broader philosophical puzzle: why should a universe governed by impersonal physical processes contain beings whose behavior is guided by reasons at all?
The argument developed in this essay may, therefore, be seen as one part of this broader puzzle.
2. Agents and Mechanisms
One way to appreciate the significance of agency is to consider the contrast between agents and mechanisms. A mechanism is a system whose behavior is entirely the product of impersonal causal processes. A thermostat, for example, responds to changes in temperature according to fixed rules. Agents are different. Agents evaluate alternatives, deliberate about what to do, and act in ways guided by their beliefs and desires.
To illustrate the difference, imagine two possible universes. In the first universe, complex physical systems behave in ways indistinguishable from human behavior. However, their behavior is entirely the result of impersonal causal processes. Internal events occur that resemble beliefs and desires, but these events do not genuinely guide behavior.
In the second universe, there are genuine agents. These beings deliberate, form intentions, and act on the basis of reasons. The second universe contains something the first does not: centers of agency. Events occur in both universes, but only in the second do things genuinely happen because an agent chose to do them.
As attested by commonsense experience, our universe appears to be of this second kind.
3. The Metaphysics of Agency
Philosophers have long debated the nature of agency. Thomas Reid argued that actions originate in agents rather than merely resulting from prior events governed by impersonal laws (Reid 1788). In the twentieth century, Roderick Chisholm developed this idea into a theory of agent causation, according to which actions are caused by agents themselves rather than by prior events (Chisholm 1964). More recently, philosophers such as Timothy O’Connor and Helen Steward have defended similar views (O’Connor 2000; Steward 2012).
The Argument From Agential Freedom does not require such theories to be correct, but they do highlight an important point: philosophers who examine the nature of action often conclude that agency involves something distinctive that is not easily reducible to ordinary causal processes.
Even philosophers who reject agent-causal theories generally agree that actions differ from ordinary events in important ways. Actions are guided by reasons, attributable to agents, and subject to normative evaluation, which is why we morally appraise one another’s conduct but do not do the same for events caused by mere machines (Mele 2009).
The existence of agency is striking and cries out for explanation — not only of how it exists, but why.
4. Naturalism and Free Agency
Human beings do not merely behave in complex ways: our behavior is typically guided by our deliberation. We consider reasons for acting, evaluate alternatives, form intentions, and then act on the basis of those intentions. In successful cases, our actions reliably track the conclusions of our deliberation.
Coordination between reasoning and behavior is essential to agency. If our actions were not systematically connected to our beliefs, intentions, and deliberations, then we would not count as agents in any recognizable sense. Our behavior would resemble the operation of a complicated mechanism rather than the activity of a rational agent. The question, then, is why the universe should contain systems in which reasoning processes reliably guide behavior in this way.
From the perspective of atheistic naturalism, the fundamental structure of reality is impersonal. Physical processes operate according to laws that are indifferent to purposes, meanings, or reasons. Yet somehow these processes give rise to beings whose actions are systematically coordinated with their reasoning.
This coordination is precisely what makes agency possible. Yet if reality is fundamentally impersonal, the existence of such coordination may appear somewhat surprising. Blind physical processes have somehow given rise to creatures whose reasoning reliably governs their behavior. The remarkable feature of our world is therefore not merely that complex organisms exist, but that some of them possess systems in which deliberation genuinely shapes what they do.
This unease is not confined to theistic philosophers. Thomas Nagel (a self-described antitheist), for example, has argued that the existence of conscious, rational agency sits uneasily within a purely materialist conception of nature. In his view, the emergence of mind, reason, and agency may point toward deeper teleological features of reality not captured by standard atheistic naturalism (Nagel 2012).
5. Theism Predicts Agency
According to classical theism, the ultimate foundation of reality is itself a rational agent.3 God is not some impersonal force but, instead, a mind capable of knowing, intending, and acting. If the ultimate explanation of the universe is itself agential, then it is far less surprising that derivative agents should exist within creation. A reality grounded in mind is exactly the sort of reality in which beings capable of deliberation, intention, and action might reasonably be expected to emerge.
Indeed, many theistic traditions explicitly interpret human agency in this way. Within the Jewish and Christian traditions, for example, human beings are often described as created in the image of God. Among other things, this idea has been taken to mean that human beings share (albeit in a finite and derivative way) certain capacities that characterize the divine mind, including rationality, intentionality, and the ability to act for reasons. The idea that rational creatures reflect the rationality of their creator has deep roots in the monotheistic philosophical tradition and continues to inform contemporary theistic accounts of personhood and agency (see, e.g., Aquinas ST I.93; Adams 1999; Stump 2010). On such a view, agency is not merely a surprising byproduct of blind processes but, instead, a natural feature of a world created by a rational agent who intends to bring about beings capable of understanding, deliberation, and action.
Theism also offers a straightforward explanation of the coordination between reasons and actions that characterizes agency. As we saw earlier, agency requires that an agent’s reasoning reliably guide behavior. When we deliberate about what to do and arrive at a conclusion, our bodies typically respond in ways that carry out the resulting intention. This alignment between reasoning and action is precisely what allows deliberation to play a meaningful role in our lives.
If the universe is the creation of a rational agent, this coordination is expected. A rational creator would, plausibly, wish to bring about creatures whose cognitive and behavioral systems are structured in ways that allow their reasoning to guide their conduct.
Thus, on theism, the existence of agents whose actions are systematically connected to their deliberation is exactly what we might expect. A world containing such agents would be a natural expression of a reality whose ultimate foundation is itself rational and agential.
6. The Argument From Agential Freedom
My central contention is this: the existence of agential freedom is more expected if the ultimate foundation of reality is itself agential than if the universe is fundamentally impersonal. If theism is true — if reality ultimately arises from a rational agent — then the existence of derivative agents within the universe is unsurprising. If atheist naturalism is true, by contrast, the existence of genuine agents is more puzzling.
This Argument From Agential Freedom can be stated in standard form as follows:
1. There is agential freedom: some beings in the universe act for reasons and exercise control over their actions.
2. If theism is true, the existence of agents is not surprising.
3. If atheistic naturalism is true, the existence of agents is surprising.
4. Therefore, the existence of agential freedom is more probable on theism than on atheistic naturalism.
5. Therefore, the existence of agential freedom constitutes evidence for theism.
The force of the argument is comparative rather than demonstrative: agency need not be impossible on naturalism in order to count as evidence for theism. The conclusion is intentionally modest. The argument is not that agential freedom proves theism. Rather, it claims that the existence of agency is more expected on theism than on atheistic naturalism, and therefore provides some evidential support for theism.
7. Scope of the Argument
The Argument From Agential freedom does not depend on the universe containing large numbers of agents. Even if human beings were the only agents in existence, the philosophical question would remain: why does reality contain any agents at all?
A universe containing even a single genuine agent would already differ in a fundamental way from a universe containing only impersonal processes.
The argument therefore concerns the existence of agency itself, not the quantity or distribution of agents within the cosmos.
8. Agency and Psychophysical Harmony
Agency requires a remarkable coordination between mental states and physical processes. For an agent to act, intentions formed in the mind must reliably translate into bodily movements. When we decide to raise our hand, our arm typically rises. When we decide to speak, our vocal apparatus produces the words we intend.
In an earlier essay, I discussed this phenomenon under the label psychophysical harmony: the striking alignment between our mental states and the structure of the physical world. Our perceptions reliably track features of our environment, and our intentions reliably guide the bodily movements necessary to carry out our decisions (Crummett and Cutter 2020). More generally, the problem of how mental states can make a difference to bodily behavior has long occupied philosophers of mind, and coherent agency depends on some satisfactory account of this connection (Kim 1998; Lowe 2008).
Without such harmony, coherent agency would be impossible. If the connection between mental states and physical processes were chaotic or unreliable, our deliberations would have little effect on what we actually do. Decisions would fail to translate into action, and our behavior would resemble the erratic movements of a malfunctioning machine rather than the activity of a rational agent.
Agential freedom, however, represents a more specific phenomenon than psychophysical harmony in general. It is one thing for mental states to be systematically correlated with physical processes. It is another thing for an agent’s reasoning to guide action in a way that reflects deliberation.
In principle, a world might exhibit psychophysical harmony without containing genuine agency. Mental states might reliably correlate with physical behavior in ways that produce predictable patterns of action without those actions being guided by deliberation or reasons. The systems in question might behave in orderly ways while still functioning essentially like complex mechanisms.
What distinguishes genuine agency is that an agent’s reasoning plays a governing role in the production of behavior. We consider reasons for acting, evaluate alternatives, form intentions, and then act on the basis of those intentions. Our actions track the conclusions of our deliberation.
This deeper coordination between reasoning and behavior is precisely what makes agential freedom possible. But it also raises a philosophical question: why should the universe contain systems in which deliberation reliably governs action?
If the universe is ultimately grounded in impersonal physical processes, then the existence of such coordination may appear somewhat surprising. By contrast, if reality is ultimately grounded in a rational agent, the existence of creatures whose reasoning guides their actions is far less mysterious.
Thus, agential freedom may be understood as a particularly striking form of psychophysical harmony — one in which the activity of reasoning itself plays a causal role in shaping the physical world.
9. Agency and the Argument from Reason
The Argument From Agential Freedom also connects with a related philosophical argument concerning human rationality. Philosophers such as C. S. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga have argued that naturalism faces difficulties explaining the reliability of human reasoning. If our beliefs are ultimately produced by nonrational physical processes, it becomes difficult to see why those beliefs should be expected to track truth (Lewis 1947; Plantinga 2011). Related concerns about the place of normativity, rational explanation, and reason-responsiveness within a naturalistic ontology have also been raised by philosophers working outside explicitly theistic apologetics (Nagel 2012; Korsgaard 2009).
Agency is closely connected with this issue. To act for reasons is to respond to considerations one takes to count in favor of an action. Genuine agency, therefore, presupposes the capacity for rational deliberation.
Thus, the phenomena of rationality, agency, and reason-responsiveness form a philosophical cluster. Each appears more at home in a reality ultimately grounded in mind rather than in impersonal mechanisms.
10. Objections and Replies
Several naturalist responses to this argument deserve consideration. The claim advanced in this essay is not that agency is impossible in a naturalistic universe, but that its existence is less expected on naturalism than on theism. For that reason, it is important to examine whether naturalistic explanations might remove the appearance of surprise.
Three kinds of response are especially common. First, one might argue that evolutionary processes explain the emergence of agents. Second, one might suggest that agency itself is illusory — that the sense of deliberation and decision is merely a byproduct of underlying brain processes. Third, one might deny that agency is surprising on naturalism at all, maintaining that sufficiently complex physical systems naturally give rise to reason-guided behavior.
10.1 Evolution Explains Agency
A naturalist might argue that evolutionary processes explain the emergence of agency. Organisms capable of flexible behavior and decision-making may enjoy survival advantages.
Evolutionary explanations are indeed powerful. However, they explain how agency might arise given certain background conditions. They do not explain why reality should contain the kinds of systems capable of agency in the first place.
Evolutionary explanations therefore presuppose that the universe already contains systems capable of reasoning and action. They do not explain why a universe governed by impersonal physical laws should give rise to such systems in the first place.
10.2 Agency Is an Illusion
Another response is that agency may be an illusion produced by brain processes. On this view, human beings do not genuinely make decisions or act for reasons. Rather, the brain generates the feeling of deciding after the relevant physical processes have already determined what will occur.
Versions of this idea appear in some interpretations of neuroscience and psychology. According to these views, the sense that we consciously choose our actions is merely a byproduct of underlying neural mechanisms.
However, this proposal faces significant difficulties. Our ordinary practices of reasoning, deliberation, planning, and responsibility all presuppose that agents genuinely make decisions. When we deliberate about what to do, we treat our reasoning as capable of influencing our actions. When we offer advice, criticize behavior, or make commitments, we assume that agents are capable of responding to reasons.
If agency were merely an illusion, these practices would become deeply puzzling. The very activity of arguing for the illusion thesis would itself presuppose the existence of agents capable of evaluating reasons and revising their beliefs accordingly.
More importantly, the illusion hypothesis does not eliminate the explanatory problem raised by this essay. Even if the sense of agency were illusory, the universe would still contain systems that behave exactly like agents — systems in which reasoning processes appear to guide behavior in sophisticated ways. The question would remain why impersonal physical processes give rise to systems exhibiting such strikingly agent-like organization.
Thus, the illusion hypothesis does not remove the phenomenon the argument seeks to explain. At most, it redescribes it.
10.3 Agency Is Not Surprising on Naturalism
A final objection is that agency may not be surprising on naturalism at all. Complex physical systems might naturally give rise to agents in the same way that they give rise to life, intelligence, or other emergent phenomena.
There is certainly no reason to deny that sufficiently complex systems could exhibit agent-like behavior. Biological organisms, after all, are extraordinarily sophisticated physical systems. Evolutionary processes may favor organisms capable of flexible behavior, planning, and decision-making.
However, the Argument From Agential Freedom does not claim that agency is impossible on naturalism. Rather, it concerns comparative expectation.
The question is which worldview provides a more natural context for the existence of agents. On naturalism, the fundamental structure of reality is impersonal and indifferent to purposes, meanings, and reasons. The laws governing physical processes make no reference to deliberation or intention. Yet from these impersonal processes arise beings whose reasoning appears to play a genuine role in shaping their actions.
On theism, by contrast, the ultimate foundation of reality is itself rational and agential. In such a framework, the existence of derivative agents is not unexpected. A world containing beings capable of deliberation and reason-guided action would be a natural expression of a reality grounded in mind.
Thus, the claim is not that agency cannot arise in a naturalistic universe. The claim is that its existence appears less expected on naturalism than on theism.
Conclusion
The Argument From Agential Freedom is best understood as one component of a broader cumulative case for theism. A number of features of reality demand explanation once we step back and reflect on them: consciousness, rationality, moral knowledge, and the capacity for meaningful interpersonal relationships. Each of these phenomena raises questions about how they fit within a universe ultimately governed entirely by impersonal physical processes. Agential freedom belongs naturally alongside these other features of human life. The existence of beings who deliberate about what to do, form intentions, and act on the basis of reasons is not merely a familiar aspect of our experience: it is a remarkable feature of the world.
The central claim of this essay has been that the existence of such agents is more expected if the ultimate foundation of reality is itself agential than if reality is fundamentally impersonal. If theism is true — if the universe ultimately arises from a rational mind — then the existence of derivative agents within creation is not surprising. A world containing conscious beings capable of reasoning, deliberation, and intentional action would be a natural expression of a reality grounded in mind. If atheistic naturalism is true, by contrast, then the existence of such agents is puzzling. The laws governing the basic structure of reality make no reference to purposes, intentions, or reasons, yet from these impersonal processes emerge beings whose behavior is systematically guided by deliberation.
The existence of rational agents fits more comfortably within a theistic worldview than within a purely naturalistic one. For that reason, the existence of agential freedom provides at least some degree of evidence for theism. When considered alongside other philosophically striking features of reality, the phenomenon of agency contributes to a broader picture in which a universe grounded in mind appears less surprising than one grounded solely in impersonal processes.
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Some writers refer to this capacity as rational agency. For present purposes, I draw no sharp distinction between rational agency and agential freedom.
For more on the standard problem of free will, see here:
Some classical theists in the strongly apophatic tradition dislike speaking of God as an agent; however, as best I can tell this stems from a reluctance to positively characterize God as anything in particular. Yet such people do think that God exists (they aren’t atheists) and has the features — or at least features in all relevant respects analogous to — those the rest of us understand as constitutive of rational agency.
yeah I think this is a pretty forceful argument
Hi JP, I’d love if you wrote something on the problem of suffering. Many theodicies are very present-focused, when we know conscious beings have existed for billions of years before us and humans hundreds of thousands of years before Abrahamic religion. I trust someone like yourself to take it seriously!