I am curious about your views on eating farm raised organic animal products and how that fits in a "nearveganist" framework?
You specified "factory farmed animal products" several times for key definitions, but did not discuss the distinction of organic farm raised and the relative moral weight those decisions contain. Significantly less suffering, though more expensive (rightly so). And categorically non-vegan.
Thanks! I appreciate it. I intentionally focused on factory farming because that’s where the overwhelming majority of animal suffering occurs. I also agree that higher-welfare farming is morally preferable to factory farming. At the same time, I think many of its moral costs tend to be overlooked. So while I think higher-welfare animal products occupy a different moral position than factory-farmed ones, I also think they fall short of the moral ideal. Exactly where they fit within the nearvegan framework is a more difficult question than I tried to address here, and one I’d like to explore in a future essay.
The most common non-vegan consumption pattern that is closest to veganism is vegetarianism. With the increasing prevalence of vegan options, vegetarians are now eating increasingly vegan meals quite by accident as their options in restaurants and now often vegan by default, as are the meat-free alternatives they buy in supermarkets, and non-dairy milk is now very common.
Yes, a good observation. One reason I distinguish nearveganism from reducetarianism is that I have in mind a pattern of consumption that is overwhelmingly plant-based, not merely one involving occasional reductions. In practice, many contemporary vegetarians may already be much closer to that ideal than the traditional vegan/non-vegan distinction suggests.
Thank you for this detailed post. It is a valuable contribution to a debate that too often gets stuck in the vegan/non-vegan binary.
I do disagree with one of your statements, though: "An occasional slice of birthday cake containing dairy or a rare social exception does not represent moral failure."
I still believe it does, under ordinary circumstances, represent a moral failure. A relatively small one, perhaps, but a failure nonetheless. The cost to oneself of declining an occasional slice of birthday cake is presumably very low, if not zero. And if the cost rises considerably (through social isolation, stigmatization, and so on), I think there are still other ways to address it: maintaining good communication, learning how to explain your position persuasively, strategic timing, or simply saying "I am full". Barring extraordinary circumstances in which declining the cake would be very costly, I struggle to see what would justify the exception.
Thanks for reading. I agree that, considered in isolation, an unnecessary purchase of an animal product may well be morally wrong. My claim is directed at a different question: whether an overwhelmingly vegan pattern of consumption loses its moral significance because of occasional departures from the ideal. I don’t think it does. Nearveganism is meant to recognize morally serious approximation to the ideal without denying that particular departures may themselves be wrong.
Great article, love the concept.
I am curious about your views on eating farm raised organic animal products and how that fits in a "nearveganist" framework?
You specified "factory farmed animal products" several times for key definitions, but did not discuss the distinction of organic farm raised and the relative moral weight those decisions contain. Significantly less suffering, though more expensive (rightly so). And categorically non-vegan.
Thanks! I appreciate it. I intentionally focused on factory farming because that’s where the overwhelming majority of animal suffering occurs. I also agree that higher-welfare farming is morally preferable to factory farming. At the same time, I think many of its moral costs tend to be overlooked. So while I think higher-welfare animal products occupy a different moral position than factory-farmed ones, I also think they fall short of the moral ideal. Exactly where they fit within the nearvegan framework is a more difficult question than I tried to address here, and one I’d like to explore in a future essay.
Love to hear it, looking forward to that essay. Thanks for the reply
The most common non-vegan consumption pattern that is closest to veganism is vegetarianism. With the increasing prevalence of vegan options, vegetarians are now eating increasingly vegan meals quite by accident as their options in restaurants and now often vegan by default, as are the meat-free alternatives they buy in supermarkets, and non-dairy milk is now very common.
Yes, a good observation. One reason I distinguish nearveganism from reducetarianism is that I have in mind a pattern of consumption that is overwhelmingly plant-based, not merely one involving occasional reductions. In practice, many contemporary vegetarians may already be much closer to that ideal than the traditional vegan/non-vegan distinction suggests.
Thank you for this detailed post. It is a valuable contribution to a debate that too often gets stuck in the vegan/non-vegan binary.
I do disagree with one of your statements, though: "An occasional slice of birthday cake containing dairy or a rare social exception does not represent moral failure."
I still believe it does, under ordinary circumstances, represent a moral failure. A relatively small one, perhaps, but a failure nonetheless. The cost to oneself of declining an occasional slice of birthday cake is presumably very low, if not zero. And if the cost rises considerably (through social isolation, stigmatization, and so on), I think there are still other ways to address it: maintaining good communication, learning how to explain your position persuasively, strategic timing, or simply saying "I am full". Barring extraordinary circumstances in which declining the cake would be very costly, I struggle to see what would justify the exception.
Thanks for reading. I agree that, considered in isolation, an unnecessary purchase of an animal product may well be morally wrong. My claim is directed at a different question: whether an overwhelmingly vegan pattern of consumption loses its moral significance because of occasional departures from the ideal. I don’t think it does. Nearveganism is meant to recognize morally serious approximation to the ideal without denying that particular departures may themselves be wrong.